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Abstract
Iterative auctions have many computational advantages over
sealed-bid auctions, but can present new possibilities for
strategic manipulation. We propose a two-stage technique
to make iterative auctions that compute optimal allocations
with myopic best-response bidding strategies more robust to
manipulation. First, introduce proxy bidding agents to con-
strain bidding strategies to (possibly untruthful) myopic best-
response. Second, after the auction terminates adjust the
prices towards those given in the Vickrey auction, a sealed-
bid auction in which truth-revelation is optimal. We present
an application of this methodology to iBundle, an iterative
combinatorial auction which gives optimal allocations for
myopic best-response agents.
Introduction
Many interesting problemsinvolvingdistributed agents, e.g.
task assignment, distributed scheduling, etc. can be formu-
lated as resource allocation problems, with a set of discrete
items to allocate to agents (Clearwater 1996). A common
goal is to maximize the total value of the allocation over all
agents, while respecting information decentralization, au-
tonomy, and the self-interest of individual agents within a
system. Auctions provide simple and robust mechanisms,
and can compute optimal or near-optimal solutions in inter-
esting problems (Wellman et al. 1999).
Iterative auctions, in which agents can bid continuously
during an auction as prices are adjusted, have a number
of computational advantages over sealed-bid auctions, in
which agents must submit bids simultaneously in a single
round. Agents can perform incremental computation about
theirvaluesfordifferentallocationsaspriceschange(Parkes
1999a), and make new bids in response to bids from other
agents. This is important in problems with hard valuation
problems, consider for example a task allocation problem
with agents that solve local optimization problems to com-
pute the cost of performing additional task given existing
commitments (Sandholm 1993).
Iterative auctions have been designed to solve non-trivial
resource allocation problems, for example for auctions
in multiple identical items (Ausubel 1997), and iBundle
(Parkes 1999b) for the combinatorial resource allocation
problem.
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However,iterativeauctionspresentpossibilities forstrate-
gic manipulationbecause informationis exchangedbetween
agents via bids and prices during an auction. A rational
agentwith look-aheadcantry tomanipulatethe bidsofother
agentsandtheoutcomeofanauction,forexamplewithjump
bidsatpricesabovethecurrentaskprice,orbydelayingbids
until the auction is about to close. Manipulation is undesir-
ablebecauseit reducestheeconomicefﬁciencyofoutcomes,
and because it is inherently complex.
We propose a new method, “proxy agents and price-
adjustment”, to prevent strategic manipulation in iterative
auctions. The method applies to iterative auctions that com-
pute optimal resource allocations in competitive equilib-
rium.1 We adjust prices retrospectively after an auction ter-
minates towards prices that provide incentives for agents to
bid truthfully.
The goal is to computethe prices that agents wouldpay in
the Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA) (Varian & MacKie-
Mason 1995), a sealed-bid auction for combinatorial re-
source allocation problems. The prices in the GVA pro-
vide strong truth-revelation properties; truth-revelation is a
dominant strategy, optimal for a self-interested agent for
all strategies of other agents. When successful, in combi-
nation with proxy bidding agents, the iterative auction re-
tains its computational advantages and inherits the strategy-
proofness of the GVA. The proxy agents bid on behalf of
agents, and constrain bidding strategies to best-response to
prices based on (possibly untruthful) information received
from agents about their values for items.
Our insight is that an interpretation of iterative auc-
tions within primal-dual optimization theory presents a
method, Adjust, to compute minimal competitive equilib-
riumprices after an auctionterminates, based on bidsplaced
by agents during the auction, i.e. prices that minimize the
auctioneer’s revenue in equilibrium. Extending recent re-
sults in Bikchandani & Ostroy (1998), we prove that GVA
prices can always be computed from “enough” minimal CE
prices. A variation, Adjust*,o nAdjust closes the gap
between minimal CE prices and GVA prices. We character-
ize necessary and sufﬁcient conditions on agents’ bids and
prices for Adjust* to compute GVA prices, and propose a
dynamictest allowsan auctioneerto detect whenthe auction
1In competitive equilibrium all agents maximize utility with the
ﬁnal allocation given the ﬁnal prices, and the auctioneer maximizes
revenue.has terminated with GVA prices.
We also suggest approximate procedures, Adj-Pivot
and Adj-Pivot*,f o rAdjust and Adjust* with neg-
ligible computation that work well in practice. The meth-
ods leverage computationalready performedby the auction-
eer during the auction, in solving a sequence of winner-
determination problems.
As an applicationof ourframework,we consideriBundle,
an ascending-price combinatorial auction which gives opti-
mal allocations for myopically-rationalagents. iBundle and
Adjust compute minimal CE prices in all problems. We
characterize sufﬁcient conditions on agents’ valuation func-
tions for Adjust* to compute GVA prices. Experimental
results verify that iBundle with price-adjustment computes
minimal CE prices across a suite of hard problems, and of-
ten compute prices which are within 2% of GVA prices.
Incentive Compatible Auctions
In this section, we explain why truth-revelation is optimal
for an agent in the Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA), and
discuss the consequences of achieving Vickrey prices in an
iterative auction.
The GVAcomputesoptimalresourceallocationsevenwith
strategic self-interested agents.2 It is an incentive compat-
ible auction: an agent’s optimal bidding strategy is truth-
revelation,i.e. bid theexactamountthatitvaluesanitem, or
bundle of items. The GVA extends Vickrey’s (1961) seminal
second-price sealed-bid auction, which sells a single item to
the highest bidder for the second-highest price, to auctions
for bundles of items.
Let
G denote the set of items to be auctioned,
I denote
the set of agents, and
v
i
(
S
) denoteagent
i’s value for bundle
S
￿
G of items. We assume risk-neutral agents with quasi-
linear utilities in money,
u
i
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S
;
p
)
=
v
i
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S
)
￿
p, for price
p,
and equate optimal strategies with utility-maximization.
The GVA is a direct-revelation mechanism,i nw h i c h
agents report (possibly untruthful) values for bundles of
items. Let
^
v
i denote agent
i’s reportedvalue, not necessarily
equal to its true value. The auctioneer computes the alloca-
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where
S
￿
i is the revenue-maximizing allocation with the
bids from all agents except agent
i.T h e GVA prices the
marginal negative effect that an agent’s presence has on the
reported value of the outcome to the other agents.
Deﬁnition 1. Dominant strategy. A bidding strategy is dom-
inantif it isoptimalforallbiddingstrategiesof otheragents.
Truth-revelation, i.e. a bid
^
v
i
=
v
i, is a dominant
strategy in the GVA. The proof is straightforward: agent
i’s utility,
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+
2The GVA is not robust to manipulation by colluding agents
(Sandholm 1996). Similarly, the methods that we present in this
paper do not prevent collusive manipulation of iterative auctions.
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(
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￿
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j
). Agent
i can maximize the
sum of the ﬁrst two terms by reporting
^
v
i
=
v
i because this
is precisely the objective function that the auctioneer maxi-
mizes to select allocation
S
￿. The ﬁnal term is independent
of agent
i’s bid.
We will refer to this outcome, i.e. allocation,
S
￿ and pay-
ments
p
g
v
a
(
i
),a st h eVickrey outcome.
Vickrey Prices in an Iterative Auction
One might think that if an iterative auction implements
the Vickrey outcome with agents that follow myopic best-
response bidding strategies, then myopic best-response
would be a dominant strategy for self-interested agents.
In fact, manipulation remains possible with a non best-
response strategy.
Deﬁnition 2. Myopic best-response bidding strategy. Bid to
maximize utility in the current round, taking prices as ﬁxed.
Deﬁnition 3. Auction
A myopically implements the Vickrey
outcome if the auction terminates with the Vickrey outcome
for agents that follow myopic best-response bidding strate-
gies.
Let
B
R
(
v
i
;
p
) denote the best-response bid for agent
i
with valuation function
v
i,w h e r e
p is the current prices in
the auction. Call this a truthful myopic strategy. Also, let
B
R
(
^
v
i
;
p
) denote an untruthful myopic bidding strategy for
agent
i, for some valuation function
^
v
i
6
=
v
i.
We derive the following result, for agents that are con-
strained to (possibly untruthful) myopic best-response bid-
ding strategies. It is immediate from the incentive properties
of the GVA:
Theorem 1. Truthful myopic bidding is a dominant strat-
egyin aniterative auction
A thatmyopically-implementsthe
Vickrey outcome, if all agents are constrained to following a
(possibly untruthful) myopic best-response bidding strategy.
That is, assume agent
i must place bids in every round of
the auction that are consistent with a myopic best-response
bidding strategy,
B
R
(
^
v
i
;
p
), for some valuation function
^
v
i,
that does not need to equal the agent’s actual valuation
v
i.
Given this, truth-revelation, i.e. following a best-response
strategy for
^
v
i
=
v
i, is optimal.
This is weaker than the strategy-proofness of the GVA,
where truthful bidding is dominant in a system with unre-
stricted bidding strategies. Gul & Stacchetti (1997) prove
the following more general result:
Theorem 2. Truthful myopic bidding is a sequentially ratio-
nal best-response to truthful myopic biddingby other agents
in an iterative auction
A that myopically-implements the
Vickrey outcome.
We use proxy bidding agents to force agents to follow
best-response bidding strategies, and leverage Theorem 1.
With this, an iterative auction that myopically implements
the Vickrey outcome inherits the incentive compatibility of
the GVA.
2Proxy Bidding Agents
We introduce semi-autonomous proxy bidding agents at the
auctioneer,throughwhich agents must interact with the auc-
tion. The proxy agents constrain agents’ bidding strategies,
followingabest-responsebiddingstrategybasedonreported
information about an agent’s valuation function.
Let us ﬁrst suggest (and reject) a couple of undesirable
approaches to constrain agent strategies:
1. Detect and penalize deviations from a myopic best-
response strategy. This is computationally expensive
because the class of bidding strategies implemented by
B
R
(
v
;
p
) is large, and to detect an invalid strategy we
must prove that no best-response strategy from this class
can implement an agent’s bids.
2. Autonomousproxybiddingagents. Proxyagentsthatmust
receive valuation functions in an initial stage, before bid-
ding autonomously in the auction convert the iterative
auction into a sealed-bid auction. This destroys many of
the computational advantages that we outlined in the in-
troduction.
Agent
i providesincomplete information,
^
v
a
p
p
;
i about re-
ported value,
^
v
i, to its proxy agent. The reported value can
be different from an agent’s true value. Agent
i can update
the information
^
v
a
p
p
;
i during the auction, but all new infor-
mation must be consistent with previous information. The
proxy agents must always have enough information to place
best-response bids to the current prices in the auction.
With proxy bidding agents we have the following result,
from Theorem 1:
Theorem 3. Introducing myopic best-response proxy agents
to auction
A that myopically-implements the Vickrey out-
come creates auction
P
r
o
x
y
(
A
), where truth-revelation is
a dominant strategy.
This solution retains the computational advantages of it-
erative auctions because agents do not need to provide com-
plete value information up-front. If valuation functions are
large and complex the proxy agents can be implemented at
the client in a secure “wrapper”.
Example: Single item auction. As an example, here is
proxy bidding-agent variation on the English auction, in
which the item is sold to the highest bidder for its bid. The
new derivative auction is a “staged Vickrey auction”. It is
strategically equivalent to the standard Vickrey auction, but
preferable because the optimal outcome is determined with-
out complete information about all agents’ values.
Agent
i has a proxy agent that maintains a lower and upper
bound,
^
v
i and
^
v
i, on agent
i’s (possibly untruthful) value
^
v
i for the
item. When the ask price is below the lower bound the proxy agent
will bid. When the ask price is above the upper bound the proxy
agent will leave the auction. When the price is between the bounds
the proxy places no bid, and asks the agent for new bounds that
must be consistent with previous bounds, i.e. tighter. The English
auction terminates with the Vickrey price if agents follow truthful
best-response bidding strategies. Hence, by Theorem 3, it is a dom-
inant strategy for agents toprovide the proxy agents withtrue lower
and upper bounds on value.
Adjusting Towards Vickrey Prices
Now onto the second step of our design paradigm, “price-
adjustment”. We present a method to adjust the ﬁnal prices
in an iterative auction towards the Vickrey prices after an
auction terminates. The method is applicable to auctions
that terminate in competitive equilibrium (CE), such that
the allocation maximizes the utility of all agents at the ﬁ-
nal prices and the auctioneer maximizes its revenue. The
iBundle and English auctions terminate in CE. Indeed,
a fundamental connection between primal-dual optimiza-
tion theory and competitive equilibrium prices allows op-
timal auctionsto be designedand analyzed(Bertsekas 1990;
Parkes & Ungar 2000).
We introduce Adjust, a procedure to compute mini-
mal CE prices from agents’ bids after an auction terminates.
Minimal CE prices are equilibrium prices that minimize the
auctioneer’stotal revenuefromall agentsintheoptimalallo-
cation. The price paid by each agent with minimal CE prices
is always an upper-bound on GVA prices, and equal to GVA
prices when certain conditions hold on agents’ values for
bundles (Bikchandani & Ostroy 1998).
In fact, it is always possible to compute GVA prices with
“enough” minimal CE prices (they are typically not unique),
as the minimum price for each agent over all CE prices.
We propose a slight variation on Adjust, Adjust*,a n d
prove necessary and sufﬁcient conditions on agents’ bids
and prices for Adjust* to compute GVA prices. Fi-
nally, we introduce approximate procedures Adj-Pivot
and Adj-Pivot* to adjust prices.
For the rest of the paper we assume that agents follow
myopic best-response bidding strategies.
Minimal Competitive Equilibrium Prices
We can interpret equilibrium conditions within primal-dual
optimization theory (Papadimitriou & Steiglitz 1982). This
providesthe key to computeminimal CE prices fromagents’
bids and prices after an auction terminates. Complementary
slackness conditions for appropriate primal and dual formu-
lations of the global resource allocation problem are equiv-
alent to equilibrium conditions between an allocation and
prices (Bertsekas 1990; Parkes & Ungar 2000).
Consider an auction
A that terminates in equilibrium, let
p
i
(
S
) denote the price for bundle
S to agent
i,a n dl e t
S
￿
i
denote the bundle allocated to agent
i. In deﬁning a compet-
itive equilibrium we allow price discrimination, with differ-
ent prices foragents, e.g.
p
i
(
S
)
6
=
p
j
(
S
) for some
i
6
=
j and
some bundle
S. This is the most general case. In compet-
itive equilibrium the prices and allocation must satisfy the
following CS conditions:
(CS-1) Given prices
p
i
(
S
), allocation
S
￿
i maximizes
agent
i’s utility,
u
i
(
S
￿
i
;
p
i
(
S
￿
i
)
)
=
v
i
(
S
￿
i
)
￿
p
i
(
S
￿
i
)
=
m
a
x
S
f
v
i
(
S
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S
)
g.
(CS-2) Given prices
p
i
(
S
), allocation
S
￿
=
(
S
￿
1
;
:
:
:
;
S
￿
j
I
j
) maximizes the auctioneer’s revenue
over all feasible allocations.
A feasible allocation sells each item to at most one agent,
and allocates at most one bundle to each agent.
3The following result follows immediatelyfrom strong du-
ality and the complementary slackness theorem (Papadim-
itriou & Steiglitz 1982) of linear programming:
Theorem 4. In an auction that terminates in competi-
tive equilibrium, minimal prices that satisfy complementary
slackness with the ﬁnal allocation are minimal competitive
equilibrium prices.
This allows the computation of minimal CE prices after
an auction terminates, based on bids placed by agents. Re-
duce prices while: (CS-1) agents continue to maximize util-
ity with allocation
S
￿
i ;( CS-2) allocation
S
￿ continues to
maximize revenue.
Adjust. Procedure Adjust computes minimal CE prices
from agents’ bids when an auction terminates in competitive
equilibrium. Assume that agents place exclusive-or (XOR)
bids, such that they demand at most one bundle.3 Let
I
￿
denote the set of agents in the optimal allocation,
^
P denote
agents’ prices (initialized to
p
i
(
S
)), and
V
￿ denote the rev-
enue of the ﬁnal allocation. We will compute the values of
second-best allocations. An allocation
S
￿
i is a second-best
allocation if it maximizes revenue for the auctioneer with-
out allocating a bundle to agent
i, i.e. it is the second-best
allocation without agent
i.L e t
V
￿
i
(
^
P
) denote the revenue
from this allocation, computed at prices
^
P.
Adjust computes a price discount
￿
i to each agent
i
in the ﬁnal allocation, such that agent
i receives ﬁnal price
p
i
(
S
￿
i
)
=
p
i
(
S
￿
i
)
￿
￿
i.
Adjust:
for each
i
2
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￿
f
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i
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m
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n
f
V
￿
￿
V
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i
(
^
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)
;
p
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(
S
￿
i
)
g;
V
￿
=
V
￿
￿
￿
i;
^
P
i
=
m
a
x
f
^
P
i
￿
￿
i
;
0
g;4
g
Adjust selects each agent in the ﬁnal allocation in turn,
reducing its price for every bundle by the amount that the
value of the optimal allocation exceeds the value of the best
allocation without that agent.5 The maximization problem,
to solve
V
￿
i
(
^
P
) in each iteration, is
N
P-hard (Rothkopf,
Pekeˇ c, & Harstad 1998) in bundle auctions.6 Later we intro-
duce an efﬁcient approximate procedure Adj-Pivot.
Note that price reductions to each agent in the allocation
are considered incrementally and not independently, prices
^
P are adjusted according to
￿
i before reducing prices to
agent
j.
3This is without loss of generality because XOR is a completely
expressive bid language. The procedure can be extended to other
bid languages, e.g. additive-or bids through the introduction of a
dummy agent for each price bid.
4Operation
^
P
i
=
m
a
x
f
^
P
i
￿
￿
i
;
0
g indicates that price
p
i
(
S
)
to agent
i is reduced to
m
a
x
f
p
i
(
S
)
￿
￿
i
;
0
g.
5A simple optimization is possible. If
￿
i
￿
p
i
(
S
￿
i
) and agent
j
>
iis not in the revenue-maximizing allocation without agent
i
then
￿
j
=
0 .
6It can be solved in average-case polynomial time in some hard
problems with efﬁcient search algorithms; see Sandholm (1999)
for example.
Proposition. Procedure Adjust maintains CE prices.
Proof. Adjust maintains (CS-1). Prices to agents not in
the allocation are left unchanged. Agent
i in allocation
S
￿
continues to maximize utility with bundle
S
￿
i at new prices
p
i
(
S
)
￿
￿
i; its price is reduced by
￿
i on bundle
S
￿
i ,a n d
by
￿
i or less on all other bundles. By the lemma, Adjust
maintains (CS-2) because it explicitly computes the maxi-
mum value of all allocations without agent
i, and reduces
agent
i’s prices by no more than the difference between
V
￿
and this value.
Lemma. An allocation with more revenue to the auctioneer
than
S
￿ as prices are reduced to agent
i must exclude agent
i, since all prices to agent
i are reduced by the same amount
(or until they are zero).
We derivea sufﬁcientconditiononagents’bids andprices
for Adjust to compute minimal CE prices.
Assumption A. (i) Every agent
j in allocation
S
￿ bids at
price
p
j
(
S
￿
i
j
) for bundles allocated in all second-best al-
locations
S
￿
i; and (ii) Every agent
j not in allocation
S
￿
bids at price
p
j
(
S
￿
i
j
)
=
v
j
(
S
￿
i
j
) for bundles allocated in
all second-best allocations
S
￿
i.
Intuitively, when Assumption A holds, no bundles in
second-best allocations are priced too high. If agent
j re-
ceives bundle
S
￿
i
j in a second-best allocation, it had better
have bid the price of that bundle, else the price can be re-
duced (maintaining (CS-1)). In turn, this can allow agent
i
to pay a lower price but still maximize revenuewith the ﬁnal
allocation
S
￿
i .
Theorem 5. Procedure Adjust computes minimal CE
prices if agents’ bids and prices satisfy Assumption A.
Proof. By contradiction. Assume that prices
p
i
(
S
￿
i
) com-
puted in Adjust are not minimal and Assumption A holds.
If the prices are not minimal, then it must be possible to
reduce the price
p
j
(
S
￿
j
) to some agent,
j, and still main-
tain (CS-1) and (CS-2). Therefore, there are some prices to
agents
i
6
=
j that reduce the value
V
￿
j
(
^
P
) of the second-
best allocation without agent
j, so that the price
p
j
(
S
￿
j
) can
be reduced without violating (CS-2).
However, Assumption A (i), any decrease in the price of
bundle
S
￿
j
k to some agent
k in the optimal allocation and
second-best allocation
S
￿
j must be mirrored in a decrease
in the price of
S
￿
k to maintain (CS-1); and (ii), any decrease
in the price of bundle
S
￿
j
k to some agent
k not in the opti-
mal allocation but in the second-best allocation
S
￿
j violates
(CS-1) because the agent has positive utility for that bundle
but receives
S
￿
k
=
;.
Computing GVA Prices
In fact, it is always possible to compute GVA prices from
“enough” minimal CE prices. Minimal CE prices are of-
ten not unique, the same total revenue to the auctioneer can
be achieved with different distributions of revenue across
agents. We use this result to derive procedure Adjust*
4and to provenecessary and sufﬁcientconditionsfor comput-
ing GVA prices in an auction. Let
p
i
(
S
￿
i
) denote a minimal
CE price to agent
i for bundle
S
￿
i .
Theorem 6. For agent
j in the optimal allocation, the min-
imal price
m
i
n
p
j
(
S
￿
j
) over all minimal CE prices
p
j
(
S
￿
j
)
equals the GVA price.
Proof. The proof is constructive, using Adjust with
alternative orders for selecting agents
i
2
I
￿. First, ob-
serve that
p
i
(
S
)
=
v
i
(
S
) trivially satisfy (CS-1), and
also Assumption A with best-response agents. Hence,
Adjust will compute minimal CE prices by Theorem 5.
Now, let
j denote the ﬁrst agent selected in Adjust.
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Hence,
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). Therefore, the price
p
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) for
bundle
S
￿
j to agent
j equals its GVA price in at least when
agent
j
2
I
￿ is selected ﬁrst in Adjust. Finally,
p
g
v
a
(
j
)
=
p
m
i
n
;
i
(
S
￿
j
)
=
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), over all minimal CE prices.
Adjust*. This leads to procedure Adjust*, a slight vari-
ation on Adjust that computes price discounts for each
agent independently:
Adjust*:
for each
i
2
I
￿
￿
i
=
m
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n
f
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￿
￿
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￿
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(
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;
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g;
Although adjusted prices
^
p
i
(
S
￿
i
)
=
p
i
(
S
￿
i
)
￿
￿
i may not
be CE prices, the prices are strictly closer to GVA prices.
Assumption B characterizes conditions on agents’ bids and
prices that, together with Assumption A, are necessary and
sufﬁcient for Adjust* to compute GVA pricesafter an auc-
tion terminates.
Assumption B. When there is more than one agent in the
optimal allocation, an agent
j in the optimal allocation but
not in a second-best allocation
S
￿
i for some agent
i
6
=
j
bids
p
j
(
S
￿
j
)
=
v
j
(
S
￿
j
) for the bundle
S
￿
j it receives in the
optimal allocation.
In other words, every agent in the optimalallocation must
bid its value for the bundle that it receives, unless it remains
in therevenue-maximizingallocationsasbidsfromthe other
agents in the optimal allocation are ignored in turn.
Here is some intuition for the rule. Consider two agents,
1 and
2, that receive a bundle in the ﬁnal allocation, and
suppose that agent 2 bids less than its value for its bundle
S
￿
2 in the allocation. Suppose, in addition, that bids from
agents
3 and 4 maximize revenue in the second-best alloca-
tion as agent 1’s prices are reduced. Agent 1’s prices can
be reduced further and still achieve more revenue than the
bids from agents 3 and 4 if agent 2 bids more for bundle
S
￿
2. In procedure Adjust to compute minimal CE prices
this effect is neutral because the price decrease is received
in only a single agent, but in Adjust* the price decrease is
received by all agents in the optimal allocation.
Theorem 7. Assumptions A and B are necessary and sufﬁ-
cient conditionson agents’ bids and prices for Adjust* to
compute GVA prices.
Proof. [Sufﬁcient.] The proof follows from Theorem 6,
show that Assumptions A and B imply that Adjust* com-
putes the same price to each agent in the optimal allocation
as when the agents bid at prices
p
i
(
S
)
=
v
i
(
S
).
[Necessary.] By contradiction. (Case 1) Assume GVA
prices and not Assumption A. Consider agent
j in allocation
S
￿ that does not bid at price
p
j
(
S
￿
i
j
) for a bundle
S
￿
i
j that
it receives in second-best allocation without an agent
i
6
=
j.
Now, agent
i can receive a larger discount by reducing the
price
p
j
(
S
￿
i
j
) to agent
j, still maintaining (CS-1) for agent
j. Similarly for an agent
j not in allocation
S
￿ that does
not bid at price
p
j
(
S
￿
i
j
)
=
v
j
(
S
￿
i
j
) for a bundle
S
￿
i
j that
it receives in second-best allocation without agent
i
6
=
j.
The proof of (Case 2), assuming GVA and not Assumption
B is similar, consider an agent
j in the optimal allocation
that is not in some second-best allocation and does not bid
p
j
(
S
￿
j
)
=
v
j
(
S
￿
j
) for its optimal allocation.
This leads to a test that allows an auctioneer to determine
whether Adjust* computes GVA prices.The Vickrey-Test
is sufﬁcient but not necessary for GVA prices. 7
Vickrey-Test. Procedure Adjust* computes GVA prices
if agents’ bids and prices satisfy: (1) all second-best allo-
cations can be computed from agents’ bids; (2) every agent
in the optimal allocation is in every second-best allocation
if there is more than one agent in the optimal allocation.
Property (1) implies Assumption A, and Property (2) im-
plies Assumption B. Assumption B also holds if agents in
the optimal allocation bid
p
j
(
S
￿
j
)
=
v
j
(
S
￿
j
), but there is no
easy way for the auctioneer to detect this.
Example: Computing GVA Prices Consider a problem
with three agents,
I
=
f
1
;
2
;
3
g and two items,
G
=
f
A
;
B
g. The agents have the following values for bundles:
v
1
=
f
3
0
;
0
;
3
0
g,
v
2
=
f
0
;
4
0
;
4
0
g and
v
3
=
f
0
;
2
0
;
4
0
g,
for bundles
A,
B,a n d
A
B. The optimal allocation is
S
￿
=
(
A
;
B
;
;
), i.e. with items are allocated to agents 1
and 2. The Vickrey prices are
p
g
v
a
;
1
=
4
0
￿
4
0
=
0 and
p
g
v
a
;
2
=
5
0
￿
3
0
=
2
0. We consider adjusting prices in two
scenarios. In both cases initial prices are competitive equi-
librium prices, and best-response bids satisfy Assumption
A with the prices. Adjust computes minimal CE prices
in both scenarios, while Adjust* computes GVA prices in
Scenario 2.
(Scenario1)Pricesare
p
1
=
f
2
5
;
0
;
2
5
g,
p
2
=
f
0
;
2
5
;
2
5
g
and
p
3
=
f
0
;
2
0
;
4
0
g. Adjust computes minimal CE
prices:
p
1
(
A
)
=
2
5
￿
(
5
0
￿
4
0
)
=
1
5 and
p
2
=
2
5
￿
(
4
0
￿
4
0
)
=
2
5;o r
p
2
(
B
)
=
2
5
￿
(
5
0
￿
4
5
)
=
2
0 and
p
1
(
A
)
=
2
5
￿
(
4
5
￿
4
0
)
=
2
0. The result dependson which
agent is selected ﬁrst. Adjust* computes
^
p
1
(
A
)
=
1
5and
^
p
2
(
B
)
=
2
0 . Agent 2 pays its GVA price because agent 1 is
7Furthermore, GVA prices are approximately computed when
an agent in the optimal allocation “almost” bids for a bundle in a
second-best allocation, or is “almost” in every second-best alloca-
tion.
5in the second-best allocation without bids from agent 2, but
agent 1 pays above its GVA price.
(Scenario 2) Now, assume prices to agent 2 are
p
2
=
f
0
;
4
0
;
4
0
g. The prices and agents’ best-response bids
now satisfy Assumption B, because agent 2 bids its value
p
2
(
B
)
=
v
2
(
B
) for item 2. In this case Adjust com-
putes:
p
1
(
A
)
=
0 and
p
2
(
B
)
=
4
0,o r
p
2
(
B
)
=
2
0
and
p
1
(
A
)
=
2
0. Adjust* computes
^
p
1
(
A
)
=
0 and
^
p
2
(
B
)
=
2
0 , equal to GVA prices.
A Fast and Approximate Method
ProcedureAdj-Pivotis a fast approximationto Adjust,
that leverages computation already performed by the auc-
tioneer to solve the winner-determination problem in each
round of the auction. Experimental results show that it
works well in practice.
Adj-Pivot uses an approximate formulation of
Adjust as a linear program, where the value of
V
￿
i
(
^
P
) is
computedas the maximumvalue over all provisionalalloca-
tionsduringtheauction. Thesearepivotalallocations,likely
to represent allocations with high value. Adj-Pivot com-
putes
m
a
x
P
i
￿
i such that
^
p
i
(
S
)
=
m
a
x
f
0
;
p
i
(
S
)
￿
￿
i
g
for all agents,
￿
i
=
0for agents not in the optimal alloca-
tion, and the revenuefrom the optimal allocation maximizes
revenue over the set of pivotal allocations at prices
^
p
i
(
S
).
Similarly, Adj-Pivot* approximates Adjust.T h e
pricediscount
￿
i is computedfor eachagentindependently:
compute
m
a
x
￿
j such that
^
p
j
(
S
)
=
m
a
x
f
0
;
p
j
(
S
)
￿
￿
j
g,
and the revenue from the optimal allocation maximizes rev-
enue over all pivotal allocations.
Preprocessing.
As described, the price adjust procedures compute adjusted
prices from individual prices to each agent. In an auc-
tion without price discrimination, in which each bundles
are priced the same to all agents, the ﬁrst step is to con-
struct prices for each agent. Simply replicate the prices, i.e.
p
i
(
S
)
=
p
(
S
). Preprocessing can then be optionally ap-
plied, to adjustprices towardspricesthat satisfy Assumption
A, such that agent
i would bid for all bundleswith a positive
price. To give a simple example, we can reduce prices to an
agent not in the ﬁnal allocation to the prices in the last round
in which the agent placed bids.
Application: iBundle
iBundle (Parkes 1999b; Parkes & Ungar 2000) is an
ascending-price combinatorial auction in which agents can
bid directly for bundles of items. It generalizes the English
auction to the combinatorial resource allocation problem.
Bundlesare pricedexplicitly,andpricesareincreasedwhen-
ever agents’ bids are unsuccessful at the current prices. The
auctioneer selects a provisional allocation in each round of
the auction to maximize revenue, given the bids received.
iBundle computes optimal resource allocations, and ter-
minates in competitive equilibrium, with agents that follow
myopic best-response bidding strategies, i.e. bid for all bun-
dles that maximize utility in each round given the prices.
We present an application of the price-adjustment tech-
nique to variation iBundle(3) that maintains price discrim-
ination throughout the auction.8 It is trivial to prove that
iBundle(3) terminates with bids and prices that satisfy As-
sumption A, because agents bid for all priced bundles. By
Theorem 5, iBundle with Adjust computes minimal CE
prices.
Theorem 8. iBundle(3) with Adjust and myopic best-
response proxy agents computes the minimal CE prices in
combinatorial resource allocation problems.
We have the following key result, that follows from The-
orems 3 and 7.
Theorem 9. iBundle(3) with Adjust* and myopic
best-response proxy agents is incentive-compatible and
allocatively-efﬁcient in combinatorial resource allocation
problemsin whichAssumptionB holdswhen the auctionter-
minates.
The Vickrey-test allows an auctioneer to be sure that
iBundle computes GVA prices. In addition, we can char-
acterize properties on agents’ valuation functions
v
i
(
S
) in
which Assumption B will hold. As an example, Assump-
tion B holds in these problems: in the assignment problem
with unit-demands; with multiple identical items and sub-
additive valuation functions (i.e. decreasing returns); and in
problems with linear-additive valuation functions in items.
In all of these problems agents in the optimal allocation will
remain in all second-best allocations.
Experimental Results
We present experimental results for iBundle(3) with
Adjust* and Adj-Pivot*, comparing its performance
with the GVA in a number of hard problems. The problems
are PS 1–12 from (Parkes 1999b),and also problems Decay,
Weighted-random (WR), Random and Uniform in Sand-
holm (1999). Each problem set deﬁnes a distribution over
agents’ values for bundles of items. Implementation details
for iBundle, e.g. the algorithm for winner-determination in
each round, are as described in (Parkes & Ungar 2000). A
standard Simplex algorithm computes adjusted prices with
Adj-Pivot*.
The distance
D
(
p
i
(
S
￿
i
)
;
p
g
v
a
(
i
)
) between prices
p
i
(
S
￿
i
)
and GVA prices is measured with an
L
1 norm, as
P
i
j
p
i
(
S
i
)
￿
p
g
v
a
(
i
)
j
=
P
i
v
i
(
S
i
), i.e. the sum absolute dif-
ference between the price charged to each agent and its GVA
price normalized by the total value of the allocation over all
agents.9 We compute the average distance over problem in-
stances in which iBundle computes the optimal allocation,
which approaches 100% of problems as the bid increment
gets small. It is not clear how to measure distance to GVA
8iBundle auction has three variations, that differ in their price-
update rules. In this paper we use iBundle both to refer to the
family of auctions in general, and also to variation iBundle(3)i n
particular.
9An
L
1 norm is appropriate because minimal CEprices is com-
puted with a linear additive measure over the auctioneer’s price to
each agent in the allocation.
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Figure 1: Average performance of iBundle with price-adjustment
Adjust* and Pri-Adjust* in problems PS 1–12. The num-
ber of rounds to termination is varied by adjusting the minimal bid
increment.
prices in problems in which the auction’s allocation is sub-
optimal and different from the GVA.
Figure 1 plots the distance to the GVA prices in iBundle,
before and after price-adjustment using Adjust* and
Adj-Pivot*, averaged over 25 trials each of problems
PS 1–12. We ran iBundle with different bid increments to
vary the number of rounds to termination, and average per-
formance across problem sets by normalizing the number
of rounds to termination according to the minimal number
of rounds in which iBundle achieves 100% allocative efﬁ-
ciency. For comparison, we also plot the performance of
minimal CE prices.
Theaveragedistancebetweenminimal CEpricesand GVA
prices across these problems is 5.3%. For small bid incre-
ments iBundle computes prices to within 6.5% of the GVA
prices, with Adjust to within 5.5% (not plotted), and with
Adjust* and Adj-Pivot* to within 5.2%. Notice that
the prices continue to adjust towards the min CE prices for
bid increments smaller than those required for 100% alloca-
tive efﬁciency, corresponding to normalized rounds to ter-
mination
>
1.
We also compute the fraction of all problems in which
D
(
p
i
;
p
g
v
a
(
i
)
)
<
2
%, to test the proportion of problems in
which prices are approximatelyVickrey. CE prices are equal
to GVA prices in approximately 57% of problem instances.
iBundle computes GVA prices in around 38% of problem in-
stances, compared to approaching 57% with Adjust* and
Adj-Pivot*. Clearly, the results verify that Adjust*
computes minimal CE prices when Assumption A holds, as
it will in iBundle.
The minimal CE prices are close to GVA prices (average
distance
<
2
:
5
%) in problems 4–8, in which the agents in
the optimal allocation also tend to be in the second-best al-
locations. In contrast, the minimal CE prices differ from the
GVA payments by more than 5% in problems PS 1, 3, 9, 11
and 12, which are characterized by optimal allocations that
are very different from second-best allocations, and agents
with complementary demands for bundles.
As expected, an application of the Vickrey-Test over all
problemsconﬁrmednofalsepositives,aspeciﬁcityof100%,
but some false negatives, a sensitivity of 56%. The out-
come was always approximately Vickrey when indicated by
the Vickrey-Test, but Vickrey-outcomes went undetected in
some problems.
It is noteworthy that the approximate method
Adj-Pivot* is as effective as Adjust* for small
bid increments. We use Adj-Pivot* in the harder
problems plotted in Figure 2.
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
10
20
30
40
50
Run Time / GVA Run Time
D
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
 
t
o
 
G
V
A
 
P
r
i
c
e
s
 
(
%
)
iBundle   
Adj−Pivot*
CE
min  
(a) Decay. 50/10/200
iBundle   
Adj−Pivot*
CE
min  
0 10 20 30
0
10
20
30
40
50
Run Time / GVA Run Time
D
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
 
t
o
 
G
V
A
 
P
r
i
c
e
s
 
(
%
)
(b) WR. 50/30/600
iBundle   
Adj−Pivot*
CE
min  
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0
10
20
30
40
50
Run Time / GVA Run Time
D
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
 
t
o
 
G
V
A
 
P
r
i
c
e
s
 
(
%
)
(c) Rand. 50/20/400
iBundle   
Adj−Pivot*
CE
min  
0 2 4 6
0
10
20
30
40
50
Run Time / GVA Run Time
D
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
 
t
o
 
G
V
A
 
P
r
i
c
e
s
 
(
%
)
(d) Uniform. 50/30/600
Figure 2: Performance of iBundle with price-adjustment
Adj-Pivot* problem sets from Sandholm (1999). The bid in-
crement in iBundle is adjusted to give different run times.
Figure 2 illustrates the performance of iBundle with
Adj-Pivot* in Decay, WR, Random, and Uniform,
with problem sizes selected to give reasonable winner-
determination computation times. In Decay we set Sand-
holm’s
￿ parameter to 0.85. We plot the distance to
GVA prices against the relative run time of iBundle with
Adj-Pivot*to the time to computewinner-determination
and agent prices in the GVA.10 The minimal bid increment is
varied to adjust the number of rounds in iBundle, and with
thevaluesusedallocativeefﬁciencyvariesbetween93%and
100%.
Adj-Pivot* computes prices closer to GVA prices than
the minimal CE prices in Decay and Random, and minimal
CE prices are equal to GVA prices in WR (where there is
typically a single agent in the ﬁnal allocation). Prices re-
main quite far from GVA prices in the Uniform problem set
because second-best allocations are typically quite different
from optimal allocations, and Assumption B often fails.
Related Work
There have been a number of recent proposals to achieve
incentive-compatibility and allocative efﬁciency with less
10Wedo not focus on the auctioneer’s winner-determinationtime
in this paper, but note that
T
g
v
a is 362s, 9.1s, 1791s, and 138s
(on a 450MHz Pentium) for problems (a – d), i.e. the run time
for iBundle in WR is small despite the considerable slow-down in
comparison with the GVA.
7computation than the GVA, focusing on sealed-bid auctions
in special cases (Lehmann et al. 1999; Kﬁr-Dahav et al.
1998; Nisan & Ronen 1999).
For iterative auctions in particular, previous work has fo-
cused on careful control of prices during an auction, so that
the auction terminates with GVA prices. Positive results ex-
ist only for special cases (Demange et al. 1986; Gul &
Stacchetti 1997; Ausubel 1997). iBundle(3) with Adjust*
solves all of these problems because Assumption B holds
with myopic best-response bids.
Bikchandani & Ostroy (1998) provides additional moti-
vation and backgroundfor our work, formulatinglinear pro-
grams for combinatorial resource allocation problems and
relatingprimalanddualsolutionstocompetitiveequilibrium
outcomes. Wurman & Wellman (1999)provideuseful back-
ground on equilibrium prices in bundle auctions.
Milgrom (1999) presents examples of strategic-
manipulation in simultaneous ascending-price auctions on
individual items, and identiﬁes the search for strategy-proof
iterative combinatorial auctions as an important open
problem.
Conclusions
We have proposed a new method, “proxy agents and price
adjustment”,tomakeiterativeauctionsmorerobusttostrate-
gic manipulation. This is importantgiven the computational
advantages of iterative auctions over sealed-bid auctions for
biddingagents, because of dynamicprice-discoverycoupled
with incrementalcomputationonagents’valuesfordifferent
items or bundles of items.
The method introduces proxy bidding agents and ad-
justs the ﬁnal prices in an iterative auction towards Vickrey
prices. We characterize necessary and sufﬁcient conditions
on agents’ bids and prices to obtain dominant strategy truth-
revelation without a sealed-bid auction, describe a dynamic
test for an auctioneerto detect a Vickreyoutcome,and relate
the conditions to agents’ valuation functions.
We proposed both an optimal procedure Adjust* and
an approximate procedure Adj-Pivot* to reduce prices
after the auctionterminates. TheAdj-Pivot*approxima-
tion is both fast and effective. An interesting open empirical
problem is to understand the level of approximation to GVA
prices that is “good enough” to prevent most opportunities
for strategic manipulation.
Finally, this work suggests a method to design an iterative
Generalized Vickrey Auction: keep the auction open until
every agent in the optimal allocation is also in all revenue-
maximizing allocations without bids from each agent in the
optimal allocation, or bids its value. It might be useful to
keep iBundle open for longer, past the ﬁrst round in which a
competitive equilibrium outcome is computed, and increase
the prices for bundles. Paradoxically, higher prices when
iBundle terminates will allow lower adjusted prices.
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